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O ne conrenrious ropic of debarc is
whether or nor militaries should even be
involved in mine acrion a nd if so, whar exactly their role should be. Because rhe level of
military involvement in mine action currently
varies widely from region to region , there are
many different views on the subject. There are
rhose rhar believe their role should be limited,
like Hugh Morris of MineTech International,
who says, "I don' r rhink rhc military have a
role in m ine action orher rhan in a conflict siruarion where rhey can nor bring in commercial
[organizations) or NCOs. I rhink rhe military
have a role to secure their own force protection aims, be able ro allow movement of their
forces and maybe movement of civilians and
movement of refugees. Bur when ir is a postconflict siruarion, rhe military should move on
to other tasks, because they're nor civil administrators and they're nor geared to do rasks of
a humanitarian mine clearing nature. Ir
requires a lot of men and a lor of rime, and I
d on 'r believe any military has the time to do
ir. So I don't rhink rhey have a role in a post-

conflict siruarion in any counrry in rhe world
ro clear land mines." 1 H e srresses rhat although
rhe milirary, being paid for by rhc governmen t, may be able to do such tasks for less
money, if rhey are nor p roperly trained and
knowledgeable on international standards,
then they will nor be as effective as commercial or non-governmenral organizations.
Morris says, "The milira1y have nothing bur a
military role in clearing mines, and rhen your
NCOs and commercial companies are rhe
ones who will ridy up in a post-conflict situation, unless there is money pur into rhe military, a nd they'd have ro adhere ro rhe
lnrernario nal Mine Actio n Standa rds
[IMAS)."t
Chuck Meadows of PeaceTrees
Vietnam believes th at rhe milirary should be
more involved in the actual clearance of
m ines: "In my view, a ny milirary in a ny country, rheir role should be in rhc removal of any
mines ... rhar rhey may have used or pur down
in any con flier rhar rhey have been engaged in.
Then, in their own countries, I think rhey
would be the appropriate ones to assist in the
removal of a ny land mines rhatany insurgenrs,

rebels or terrorists, or a nybody else have in facr
pur in rhe ground ."2 John Wilkinson of
RONCO also sees r:he role of rhe milirary as
one of involvement in clearance, bur in addition he e mphasizes rhar their involvement in
this aspect of mine acrion is more appropriate
rhan in orher aspecrs such as mine risk education (MRE): " ... I think thar the mine acrion
in terms of the removal of rhe mines as
opposed to MRE is probably more a role for
rhe military to play."3
Another view is thar the military
should mainly be involved in rhe "behind-thescenes" of mine action, such as providing
training, equipment, logistics and planning.
Paddy Blagden, an independent consultant of
lnrernarional Mine Acrion believes rhis ro be
besr rype of involvemenr in mine acrion for
the military: "There's so much that rhe military ca n do to help rhe NCOs even wirhour
getting near a minefield, and rhar I'd be far
more happy wirh , because 1 don 'r like seeing
soldiers bei ng pushed into doing mine clearance because ir's parr of their military dury."4

I think rhere's different areas of interest, different areas of access, different areas of understanding, bur all of rhem can be bridged and can
be made ro work in a comp lementary manner."3
Some non-m ilitary m ine action workers eire particular cases
in which rheir organizations are working wirh rhe military in a harmon ious way. As an example of how rhe rwo can work hand-in-hand
Paddy Blagden rells a srory of a Japanese NCO working in Thailand

1'

Facing the Challenges
alongside one of rhe Thailand Mine Acrion Cenrer's (TMAC's)
Humanira.rian M ine Acrion Unirs (HMAUs), which are com posed of
members of rhe Thai army. The HMAU was often unable to use irs
machines, so rhe NGO would borrow them, making sure that when
rhe machines were returned, rhe HMAU could carry on irs work wirh
a fully fueled and serviced machine. Thus, rhe NCO's deminers could
use a piece of equipment too expensive for them to own for only the
cost of fuel and servicing. "And rhis synergistic relationship workedwe gor enormous assistance fro m the army as a result,"4 Blagden says.
J ohn Wilkinson says char when RO NCO firsr began working with the U .S. military in Afghanistan, they weren'r sure how to
work rogerher, parrly because rhe military didn 't really understand rhe
process of demining a nd irs value. lr didn'r rake long, rhough, as he
explains: " ... IA]s soon as we starred working, rhey understood rhe
value of dcmining, when we started finding unexploded ordnance and
landmi nes that have been missed by rhe more cursory 'mine-clearing'
rechniques."3 Bur this progress was all bur lost when rhar unit's rorarion ended, and RONCO had ro start over with rhe incoming unir.
Soon, however, RON CO's value was recognized: " ... [Bjy the rime rhe
third unit came in, our presence had been established sufficien rly long,
and there was enough histoty of whar we'd been clearing and to what
effect rhar rhe arriving unir immediately said, 'We wanr you guys to
sray, we wanr you ro conrinue doing whar you're doing.' ... [T)hey
understood the role rhar we were playing for rhem even rhough we
were nor of rhem. "3

Collaborators or Competitors;»
W ith the military working in many
areas alongside non-military mine action practitioners, one might wonder if they see one
another as collaborators or competitors. The
overall feeling in the mine action communiry
seems to be rhar the military is nor in competition wirh NGOs and commercial organizations. One reason for this cired by a number
of non-miliraty mine acrion practitioners is
rhat NCOs and commercial companies often
hire ex-milirary personnel for rheir mine
acrion work. John Wilkinson sums ir up as
fo llows: " ... [L]et's face ir-many of the people
we hire and rhat everybody else hires are form er military, especially to run our field operations. So I've never rhought thar rhere was a
sort of hard and fasr division between rhe rwo;

by Nicole Kreger, MAIC

which non-military originations could benefit. According to Chuck
Meadows, "The biggest tool rhey would have is jusr
experience and training, because in the militaries char I've been associated with, parr of rhar organ i1.arion are EO D folks and engineers that
are trained ro do rhar, whereas an NCO by ourselves might nor have
char personal experience." 2 On the orher hand, J ohn Wilkinson says,
"[ l] r's more of an organizational concept thar rhey have to bring rather
rhan experience ... . [Y]ou've gor a hierarchical sysrem in rhe m ilirary,
which, when iris given a mission or undertakes a mission, will turn ro
and pur a lor of resources aga inst and focus irs arrenrion on it. l think
that organizarional structure is something rhar we in the NCO com munity could benefit from in terms of how we approach things .... So
l think rha r more whar r:hey have to bring is the organizational
approach and rhe way rhey focus logistics and effort on a particular
rask."3

Though militaries can be a valuable resource if they use
rheir assets to mount collaborative efforts wirh non-military groups,
there a rc srill a number of challenges when involving rhe military in
mine action. Perhaps one of rhe mosr fundamental is rhe opinions and
prej udices rhar each group has towards rhe orher. Hugh Morris nores
thar " ...soldiers more often rhan nor consider civilians ro be a necessa•y evil and so are uncomfortable in rhei r presence." 1 Also, even
though non -mili rary organizations may have more experience in
humanitarian roles, soldiers may rcsisr learning from civilians. As a former military member himself, Paddy Blagden understands rhis attirude: " ... ! can rell you as an ex-military that no military man likes to
learn from [civilians] .... The lasr rhing you wanr is a rree-hugger coming alo ng and telling you how to do your business."4 However, he
thinks rhe military me n would do well to overcome rheir unwillingness ro learn from civilians, "because I rhink rhey would learn quite a
lor.. .. I rhink thar if rhey can overcome rhis unwill ingness by realizing
rhar rhey will save lives if rhey learn from people who are mine clearing the whole ri me as professionals, rhen I think ir'll help e normously.
If they won 't, then I'm afraid they've got to learn rhe ways rhar we d id
(i.e., by making a large number of mistakes), bur rhar is a very pain ful
process, and quire a lot of people can directly suffer as a result. "4 On
the orher hand, as Mr. Wilkinson arriculares, non-military organ izations can be jusr as guilty of such prejudice: " ... [I] r requires a change
of arrirude and a change of understanding on rhe parr of the military.
lr also in some ways requires a change in arrirude on the parr of rhe
NGOs-some NCOs prefer 'nor to deal wirh rhe military.' Well, rhe

What Does the Mllitarv Bring to the Table;»

J
,I

So whar advanrage, if any, is rhere to having rhe mil itary
involved in mine action' As in rhe example of Thailand mentioned
above, some mili taries may have rools at their disposal rhat are too
expensive fo r NCOs themselves to purchase. As John W ilkinson
points our, "rhey have much larger resources; rhey have the trained
EO D [explosive ordnance disposal] people. "3 If militaries and nonmilitary organizations can work our ways ro share these tools, as in the
T MAC example, such a partnership can be murually benefi cial to
borh .
Militaries also may have so me more figu rative "tools" from
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way rhings are going in terms of military presences, military interests,
people working basically on either side of the wire from each other,
rhar makes very little sense."3 Paddy Blagden agrees: "I agree fully ...
char NGOs sometimes dislike soldiers as much as the other way round,
bur ir depends very much on personalities wirhin both organizarions."5 The firsr step to successful cooperation is for both sides to
swallow rheir pride and be willing to admir that the other has a lot to
offer. T his step will probably be aided enormously by the fact rhar a
lor of NGOs and commercial organizations are comprised of some former military the mselves, wh ich should create opportunities to initially bridge the gaps between the two groups.
Another proble m when mili taries become e ngaged in mine
action is rhar rhey ofren have different priorities from the NCOs and
commercial groups. Hugh Morris describes his experience wirh priorities differing from rhe miliraty's: " ... [B]e we NGO or commercial, we
clear mines to the International Mine Acrion Standards, and that
imposes upon us a number of rules and a number of qualiry assurance
c hecks .... None of those rules apply ro rbc military, and rhe military
will clear mines as an expedient means of creating a camp, gerring ro a
target, or gerring through a minefield barricr."l Because of these standards, demining ofte n requires more rime and more paperwork rhan
rhe m ilitary is used to. If they don't understand the reasoning behind
such regulations, they can be turned off by rhe way professional mine
action organizations carry our demining. J ohn W ilkinson states, "In
many ways, a lot of dem in ing, when a military person looks at it, it's
kind of like, 'Geeze, it's a huge reporting structure; ir's relatively slower rhan mine clearance; we're nor going to be here that long'-rhose
kind of things. And rhcn on rhe ocher side of rhe wire, when an NGO
looks ar rhe military, ir's kind of like, 'You guys arc ignoring roo m uch
of the threat; you're just moving through and moving on,' ... and
again, we' re both doing the same rhing, ... ir's jusr a different approach
ro doing ir. .. ."3 This remark also rouches on anothe r issue when rhc
m ilir:uy gers involved in mine action: cimelines. As menrioncd before
with RONCO's work in Afghan istan, limited engagement times ofren
mean rhar mine acrion practitioners lose ground wirh militaries when
units change, having w re-establish their rapport with rhe incoming
soldiers and possibly re-explain their work. Paddy Blagden reaffirms
this problem : "The slight trouble with [militaries] is rhar although
they are initially pretry well-trained, as with mosr army units there's
q uite a large amount of rurnover. "4 T o overcome th is problem, John
Wilkinson says, " I rhink each has ro recognize rhe oth er's planning
rimcline and its areas of primary interest .... I think it's an issue of coming closer together and people starring to better understand what each
other does, how they do ir and why rhey do it rhe way rhey do."3
M il itaries arc also sometimes reluctant to share information
with non-military personnel, which can create difficulties when trying
ro work together in mine action. John W ilkinson describes this tendency: " ... [Y]ou've always got the issue of rhc m ilitary has a classification system and that, for operational security, they ofren don't share
information . 1 chink sometimes it's carried a little furthe r than ir needs
to be or should be."3 T his is probably one of the more difficult problems to overcome because militaries have an inherent level of secrecy
to carry on their work. As H ugh Morris explains, there is "a form of
fear by various m ili taries that the various weapons rhar [arc] dropped
[are] classified weapons, and if they [haven't] exploded, the n we as
non-military personnel should nor see these weapons." 1 Yet Morris

also chinks that the miliraty's tende ncy for elusiveness doesn't always
hinder information sharing: " ... [l]n some cases where it is not a contentious area, rhc military are pretty good at giving information to the
United Nations Mine Action C enters [UN MACs] to pass on ro people like us; but in other areas, they become quire rericenr because
they've dropped weapons that they don' t wanr us ro see how it worh.
So there the synergy is not always that simplc." 1 M orris cites Kosovo
as an example of a place where informatio n sharing with the military
is currently not bad, but he admits that his organization did meet with
some resistance when first trying to ob tain this information from the
milirary.

Improving Militarv/Non-Militarv Cooperation
Obviously, th ere is great potential for military and
non-military personnel to complement one anorher in mine
action. There are a number o f cases in countries worldwide that
demonstrate such partnership is nor only possible, but also quite beneficial. However, mosr would say thar rhere IS still room
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for improve mcnr. What suggestions do mem bers of rhe NCO
and commercial sectors of mi ne acrion have for improving
chis relationship?
Many mine action practitioners realize char there is a difference between the military and non-military approaches to mine
action. M ilitary minefield b reach ing or even what rhey sometimes call
"mi ne clearance" are not rhe same as demin ing, and mine action p ractitioners think rhe miliraty needs ro unde rstand rhe differences
betwee n rhem and why demining is so imporram. John Wilki nson
states, " ! think the military needs to better understand what demining
is ... and rhis requires a change of attitude frankly on rhe part of the
m ilitary. W e still run into situations where people say, 'Well, we don 't
do demining, we do mine clearance.' Well yeah, but, when you're sitring in a minefield, you'd better do demining, or when you' re sitting
in a field of UXO, you'd better do demining."3 Because military and
no n-miliraty organ izations often have different goals in mind when
doing their respective types of clearance, rhey may nor understand why
the other party rakes a cerrain approach ro ir; militaries may believe
that mine action is roo time-consum ing, wh ile mine action professionals think the military overlooks much of rhe problem. The bottom
line, accord ing to Mr. Wilkinson, is "we're both d oing the same
thing- we're both removing m ines and detecting and hopefully p icking up UXO, ir's just a d ifferent approach to doing it .... "3
The d isadvantage thar seems to be most agreed upon is that
many militaries getting involved in demining are not trained according to the internationally recognized standards. Chuck Meadows
expresses this as one of PeaceTrees Viernam's major obstacles: "For us,
the biggest challenge is training. lr's ensu ring the initial training for
rhe folks have been at the United Nations standards. "2 Pad dy Blagden
calls fo r rh e m il itary to " ... carry our clearance to International Mine
Action Standards .... I would say that until rhe m ilitary are capable of

doing th is, I wouldn' t like ro see them carry out all that much demining, except in emergency situations, and th e reason is because in any
one m ine-affected narion, rhere must be one national mine action program co ntrolled either centrally, or regionally b ur where each region
is integrated with rhe other regions. (I]f you want to get a complete
picture of rhe mine problem in any counrry, it is nor easy and you
have to have a central organ ization ... fill ing in the database and producing the rhrear maps and all rhe rest of ir. And if you get an army
working off on tl1e side, not provid ing information into this database,
bur having a little database of its own, which may not be compatible
with IMSMA [rhe Information Manageme nt System for Mine
Action], then you'll e nd up with inform ation that is nor getting into
the central, national mine plan. And if that quality assurance is not
done in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards,
you're really nor quire sure of what's going on."4
Mr. Blagde n cites the lack of following standards for major
prob lems with dcm in ing in Iran, " ... where although areas have been
cleared by rhe army, there have been so many accidenrs char rhe contractors working there require the work to be done again by a proper
mine clearance conrractor. What a waste of time and a waste of funds!
If rhe work was done properly beforehand chen ir would have been
alrighr."4 H e also expressed his concern for the lack of safety of militaty deminers who do nor follow these standards: "I am still though
vety saddened when I hear of accidents amo ng the military. I'm espec ially saddened when those accidents involve more rhan one person in
an explosion, unless ir was an anti-tank or ami-vehicle m ine, in which
case, ir's qu ire li kely to happen that way, provided rhe people were in
a vehicle. T he reason for this is that when six peop le are hurt because
rhey were all looking at an anti-personnel mine and somebody was
rrying to pur a pin in it or at least sore of make it safe, I realize then
rhat rhere was no dcmining d iscipline raking place at rhe site, rhar the
safety regulations were being rorally ignored, that all the safety disranees char are compulsory fo r humanitarian deminers we re being also
ignored, and that as a result, valuable human lives were, to be honest,
squandered, and I think char's a great piry...."4 H e does believe,
though , that militaries are starting to recognize the imporrance of following rhe example ser by non-mil itary mine action practitioners: " .. .I
think eventually they will come around to being much nearer ro rhe
NGOs' way of doing th ings and the commercial com panies' way of
doing thi ngs. They are already in many cases adopting rhings like the
l nrernarional M ine Action Standards ... [and] they are using the managemenr software, IMSMA ...."4 H opefully this trend will continue so
that the integration of m ilitary and civilian deminers can be streamlined for improved cooperation.
Although they may be reluctanr ro do so, m ilitaries should
be more will ing to learn from the mine action communiry. H ugh
Morris poinrs our thar because m ine action practitioners do demining
full-rime, rhe military would be wise to learn from them: " .. . [S]oldiers
that use mine detectors are trained in rhe usc of the m ine detector and
they mighr use it fo r at rhe most five or six percenr of their time on an
operation, whereas a commercial deminer ... uses a mine detector for
eight hours a d ay every single day of his life in-theatre... ." 1 Paddy
Blagden is also a proponent of rhis idea: " ... 1 don' t believe that armies
who try to do humanitarian dem ining look sideways enough ar rhe
h umanitarian mine clearing NGOs and commercial companies who
do the job full- ri me. Because I th ink they would learn quire a lot ....

(T]here have been conside rable developments in rhe procedures and
equipmenr available to NCOs, and I am constantly telling armies ...
that rhey would be very wise to look at the kinds of equipments that
are being used, and in fact, quire a lot of them are sensible enough to
have done so already."4
Another suggestion for improved cooperation is for the military to provide supporr to rhe mine action community in matte rs the
military may be better suited for rhan NGOs or commercial organizations and vice versa. Chuck Meadows, for example, believes " .. . the
improveme nt is really one of being supportive of each other's goals in
what we're doing. And in our case, that support is providing whatever the necessary assets. For us rhat means financial assets, ir means
equipm ent-it's worki ng rogerhe r in a partnership where there is
understand ing rhat the hosr nation is still in charge, but being supportive of what rheir needs are .... [I]t's nor a ma tter of manpower, ir's
a matter of training and rhen being able to provide the necessaty
equipment in cooperation with the other government officials that
oversee thar work and efforrs. "2 Paddy Blagden also suggests ways for
the military to assist mine action practitioners: " ... I bel ieve rhe military can help the NGO community immensely. T hey have equipment, they have transport; they have barracks; rhcy have training areas.
None of these things rhe NGOs have in nearly the same quantity. .. . I
believe char rhere arc lots of army barracks thar are available rhar could
make very good NGO headquarte rs -just let them have a corner of
the barracks-and there are a lot of army training areas, which NGOs
need for training the mselves. It's very hard find ing a training area .... "4
Such assets would be incredibly be neficia l for NCO or com mercial
groups and are a way for the military to help without having to commit irs own people where it may nor have the time, training o r logistics ro do so.
Along the lines of providing support but nor necessarily
"on-the-ground" manpower, some in the mine action community
propose that m ilitary cooperation be more on rhe administrative side.
Hugh Morris has had experiences wirh MincTech in which this type
of cooperation has worked wel l. " ... I do know of places where liaison
with the militaty at the UN MAC level is very good, and that is where
ir should rake place. And th is is where the military should be encouraged to open up to the people in the m ine action centers and mine
action center managers should be selected in their ability ro get on
with and operate alongside rhe milirary."l He continues, " I think that
we can work particularly well together, and rhar should be encouraged
ar rhe highest possible level, and I think this should be something that
should be pur together p rior to rhe nexr war, that civilian organizations,NGOs arc brought in straight away to work alongside the military, opera ring in support of rheir main aim, which again is force p rotection, and then we can get on with our hu manitarian roles of clearing up rhe problem fo r the local population." 1

Conclusion
I n many countries throughout rhe world, NGOs and commercial demining companies are finding themselves having to coexist
with militaries, wherher they be vis iring or indigenous. W h ile rherc are
ch allenges to this coexistence, there have been success stories and relations are im provi ng constantly as borh sides starr ro bener understand
continued on poge 5, NGOs
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The MACC/FMAC manages and
coordinates a full set of PKF demining assets.
These assets c urren rly include a Kenyan
Engineer Company, which consists of cwo
human itarian-trained manual dem ining
t roops; I a Slovakian dem ining company,
which is made up of both a man ual and a
mechan ica l demining ca p acity; and a
Bangladeshi dcmining company, which consists of manual deminers as well as a mine
detection dog (MDD) ream. In ad dition, rhe
MACC employs MECHEM, a Sourh African
civil ian conrracror, for road clearance operations, as well as a n Emergency EOD field
ream and rwo MRE field ream s.
T he prima1y ro le and responsib ility
of rhe Force dcmin ing assets is ro support
rhe mobiliry and safery of rhe PKF as well as ro
provide specialist operational capability. Once
dem arcation commences, rhe mai n focus of
work fo r rhe Force demining assets will be rhe
clearance of roads and access routes ro pillar
sires as well as clearance of the actual p illar sires
along rhe delineated bo rder becween rhe two
counrries. Currenr preparations for dem ining
in support for demarcation inrend co deploy
rhe Force demining assets as an imegrared
operation, where all assets work alongside each
other in a murually supportive manner.
The Emergency EOD field ream is
tasked to support the Force d emining assets in
their effort to respond to immediate needs for
disposing of UXO. Most com mo nly, UXO is
discovered by members of t he local popu lation, who report these discoveries ro the
MACC MRE field teams. The MRE reams
are ch en responsible for submitting the discovery reports ro the MACC/FMAC h eadquarters, including the MACC EOD ream. In
mosr cases, rhe MACC EOD ream is subseq uently tasked ro d ispose of these UXO in rhe
field. T he EOD ream and th e MRE reams
have an excellem and effective working cooperation, wh ich enables a quick response ro
UXO d iscoveries.
The MACC MRE reams regu larly
deploy ro rhe rh ree sectors of rhe M ission area
within rhe TSZ and adjacent areas, where they
carry our community-level interventions, provid ing much-needed mine risk train ing to an
average of 2,000 men, women and children
per week.
The MACC MRE personnel also

conduct landmine safery training for mission
personnel, both mil icary and civilian, and
orher h uman itarian actors operating in
Erit rea.
In 2002, the MACC determined a
need for a road verification/clearance capacity
for locating p resumably deep-buried mines
and UXO and for increasing rhe safery of
movement and m obil ity of the PKF and
h umanitarian operations in the TSZ. The flrsc
co be contacted ro do this job was UXB Africa
(Pry.) Ltd.
During UXB's contract period until
2003, che UNMEE MACC planned the operations and tasked che rouce clearance capaciry.
In mid-2003, with the realisation char deepburied mines d id nor pose t he threat that was
initially assumed, rhe MACC recommended
ch ar the contract of UXB not be cxrcndcd.
UXB concluded operations in Eritrea in midJuly 2003.
Jn mid-2003 , rhe roure clearance/
verification conrracr was relet, this rime to
address the need co clear roads in support of
the border demarcation process of rhe
Ethiopian Ericrean Bound ary Commission
(EEBC) more rapidly as well as to address rhe
existing threat of newly laid mines (30 newly
laid m ines on roads were reported in 18
months) . This rime, the contract was awarded
co MECH EM. MECHEM has three clearance components: a m echanical ream , a manual ream and an MDD component.

MACC Management
Coordination

and

A ll mine accion tasks carried our by
rhe Force demining assets are closely planned,
coordi naced and supervised by the UNMEE
MACC/FMAC. An experienced sec of boch
civilian and military staff members of rhe
MACC/FMAC is responsible for rhe receipt
of casking requests, issuance of tasking orders,
monitoring of tasks, implem encario n of quality assuran ce as well as su pervision of activities
in completion of task orders.
The o perations section of che
MACC works alongside rhc FMAC. Three
Liaison Officers (one from each d emining
contingent) work ar the FMAC. They are in
charge of directly liaising and coordinating
tasks char are issued by t he MACC operations
section. T hese officers report to rhe civilian
Operations Officer of the MACC, who is
responsible for rhe coordination of the assets
and tasking priorities.

NGOs, cominued from page 41

In addition, chcre arc military
officers working at the MACC/FMAC. These
officers arc in fact UN Military Obse1vers
(UNMOs) seconded to the MACC for specific assignments. For example, cwo UNMOs acr
as FMAC MRE Officers; one acts as rhe
Project Officer Dcmining for Demarcation;
one aces as the Field Mine Action Liaison
Officer; and one acts as the Mine Action
Liaison Officer in Addis Ababa, Echiopia. In
coral, there are currently five UNMOs second<::d ro the MACC in rank from Major ro
Lieucenant Colonel.
The civilian international staff of
the MACC are predominantly ex-military
staff from a variery of countries. The majority
of chem have considerable demining and operational m anagement experience. At the
MACC, they fi ll positions such as Programme
Manager, C hief of Operations, O perations
Officer, Regional Liaison Officers, EOD
Officer, Chief of Informacion , Logistics
Officer and Programme/Tra ining Officer. As
a ream, they are responsible for the smooth
functioning of t he UNM EE MACC.

Demining Statistics
Since its inception, the MACC has coordinated,
managed or supervised the following clearance operations:
• Clearance of 51,058,794 sq m o f land
• C learance of 9,2"'7 km of roads
• D isposal of 3,739 AP mtncs
• D isp osal of2,514 AT m ines and 48,256 items o f UXO
These figures are the results of a combined military
and civilian composite of demining operations since the
beginning of the MACC through January 2004. They
are a reflection of the commitment and cooperation to
demining operations across the Mission area-an
achievement that has been realised through joint efforts
among contributing local authorities, NGOs and Force
demining assets.

Conclusion
The integration of a MACC into a peacekeeping o peration
has w itnessed a successful management of assets coupled with a unique
skills base. This is rhe first rime in UN peacekeeping history that a
peacekeepi ng mission has effectively incorporated into the establishment of rhe mission structure an integrated civilian and m il itary mine
action headquarters. This unprecedenced achievement has been
accomplished in addicion co mine clearance of large areas of land in
Eritrea and a significant reduction of the land mine and UXO threat
for rhe local population. Being the first UN mine action establishment
to effectively integrate all civilian and military mine action components of a UN peacekeeping mission within a single headquarters
structure, t he UNMEE MACC has che potencial to se1ve as a template
for che creation of fut u re mine action centers that are parr of UN
peacekeeping operations where a mine action element is required.

The }'uture
T he largest cask yet awamng rhe
MACC/FMAC is the continuation of coordinating clearance task~ of roads, access routes to
pillar sires as well as pillar sites in Sectors
Cemer and Wcsr to support rhe demarcation
project of the EEBC. O riginally, it was intended that chis p roject would commence in 2003.
However, due to rhe poli tical sralemare
bccween the cwo countries concerning the
delineation of their border, the EEBC has been
unable to proceed with demarcatio n. As a
result, the sires for pillars in Sectors Center and
West of che TSZ remain undecided, holding
back the Force assets to demine rhe necessary
areas in preparation for marking rhe border.
Pillar sites in Sector East have already been
idencified and cleared in prepa ration fo r
demarcation as chis was underway prior to che
disagreement becween che two countries concerning the way ahead of the EEBC. In the
interim, while che international communiry
anticipates an agreement becween Ethiopia
and Eritrea concerning demarcation, rhe Force
demining assets will continue to effectively
conduct UNMEE and humanitarian clearance
tasks in areas where populations are most
affected by the chreat of mines and UXO.
Currently, chis require ment is grearesr in the
minefields of rhe Shilalo region in Sector Wesr.

"'Photos c/o the authors.
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rhe needs and goals of rhe ocher. As John W ilkinson points o ut, " ...
ic's che same rh ing, but d ifferent sides of rhe same coin,"3 and gening
those rwo sides ro work in concert wirh one another is key to the
progress of humanitarian demining and will undoubtedly benefit both
as rhey work towards the murual objeccive of a world safe from mines
and UXO.
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